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Abstract 
 
Right-wing populism is on the rise. Everywhere? Until recently, the resilience of the German 
party system to such a party has been an exception to this general trend. The establishment of 
the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in the wake of the Eurozone crisis put an end to this 
German exceptionalism. This paper tests the ‘losers of modernization’-thesis, one of the most 
dominant explanations for right-wing populist voting, for the case of the AfD. Based on 
district level data from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and 
Spatial Development and official data on electoral outcomes, we examine whether the socio-
economic characteristics of a district yield any explanatory power for the AfD’s electoral 
success in the federal elections of 2013 and the elections to the European Parliament in 2014. 
With this data, we avoid problems of representativeness and reliability of survey data with 
respect to socio-economically marginalized groups and their voting behavior. Our findings 
suggest that the modernization thesis bears little relevance for the success of the populist right 
in Germany. By contrast, we find a strong correlation between the AfD’s electoral success 
and the success of radical right parties in previous elections in the same district. We explain 
this intriguing finding with a “tradition of radical right voting” and a specific political culture 
on which the AfD has been able to draw once the broader political and social context allowed 
for the creation of a right-wing populist party in Germany.  
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Introduction 
 
With the electoral success of the Austrian FPÖ, the Dutch VVP, the French Front National, 
the Swiss SVP, the Sweden Democrats, and the Trues Finns amongst others, European right-
wing populism has become the most extensively analyzed party phenomenon in recent 
political science scholarship (Mudde, 2016). It is therefore not surprising that the recent entry 
of a right-wing populist party to various German state parliaments (although the party 
narrowly missed the legal five-percent threshold in the last federal elections of 2013) attracted 
substantial scholarly attention, even more so since the right wing populist party has emerged 
with a considerable delay compared to the party systems of its European neighbors (see 
Bornschier, 2012; Arzheimer, 2015).1 Studies about the electorate of the Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD), the Alternative for Germany, proliferate (Goerres et al., 2017; Berbuir et 
al., 2015; Schmitt-Beck, 2014; Frank, 2015). Yet, a thorough analysis is still hindered by few 
observations, problems of reliability and representativeness of survey data, and from the fact 
that few data sets combine detailed socio-economic information with information on political 
attitudes and/or electoral behavior (De Vries and Hoffmann, 2016). Studies that rely on 
qualitative interviews come with their own methodological problems (Michelsen et al., 2017). 
In this paper, we investigate into the determinants of electoral support for the Populist Radical 
Right (PRR) in Germany with the help of a data set that avoid the shortfalls of previous 
studies. 
 
We want to test the ‘loser of modernization’-framework that figures so prominently in the 
literature on right wing-populism (Mudde, 2007b; Betz, 1994; Betz, 1998) for the case of the 
German AfD. The ‘loser of modernization’-framework identifies those that suffer from recent 
economic change, for instance the unskilled and low-skilled (manual) workers, as the 
electoral group from which populist parties draw their main support. This is either understood 
in a direct sense as an economic protest vote of those disadvantaged by economic structural 
change due to globalization, tertiarization or digitalization, or in an indirect sense, namely that 
the economically disadvantaged strata of the society are more likely to hold exactly those 
political attitudes that parties of the new populist right primarily address (Kitschelt, 2007). 
However, the fact that the rise of the AfD parallels the spectacular revival of the German 
economy after the shock of the Great Recession in 2008/09, and that the party initially had 
                                                 
1 The party is today represented in 13 of 16 state parliaments in Germany. 
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rather voiced an upper-middle class protest against the Euro nurtures some skepticism as to 
how applicable the ‘losers of modernization’ explanation really is in this case. 
  
Specifically, we ask whether deprivation explains the electoral success of right-wing 
populism in Germany. We use a broad concept of deprivation. Unemployment or low income 
alone might not be ideal indicators for the various other dimensions of being ‘left behind’: 
unhealthy life-styles, high and persistent unemployment, poor public infrastructure, unsafe 
neighborhoods. Moreover, income inequality as a relative concept might also say little about 
‘real’ need. Narrowing in on unemployment or income therefore does not full justice to the 
complex nature of social and economic deprivation and might be insufficient as an 
explanation when it comes to the question of who votes for populist parties. Our main 
independent variable is therefore an encompassing concept of economic and social 
deprivation that captures the multidimensionality of the phenomenon, namely an index that 
comprises many other measures beyond income.  
 
As a database, we use the Regional Indicators dataset (INKAR) of the Federal Institute for 
Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (Raumforschung, 2016) and 
merge it with official data on the electoral success of the AfD in administrative districts (Kreis 
or kreisfreie Stadt). To the best of our knowledge, this dataset has not been used in this 
literature so far. We trade the disadvantage of aggregation, i.e. the methodological problem of 
a potential ecologic fallacy, against the disadvantage of either simply lacking the adequate 
data or of serious problems of non-reliability and non-representativeness of existing surveys. 
The problem of under-representation is particularly sensitive in our context as we are 
interested in the political behavior of marginalized group of voters, who tend to be 
marginalized in survey data as well. And we are interested in the party choice for an extreme 
party, which – like vote abstention – tends to be substantially under-reported in survey data, 
too. We take this as a strong argument in favor of using hard evidence with respect to 
electoral behavior, namely official election results, and of combining these with detailed 
information about the socio-economic structure in a given district. 
 
To preview our main result: first, we find no evidence in support for the ‘losers of 
modernization’-hypothesis. Economic deprivation does not predict a right-populist vote. But 
if it is not socio-economic conditions, what then drives support for the AfD? Our data 
indicates, second, the propensity of certain electoral milieus to cast a right-populist vote, as 
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we can show that the districts with a high share of a radical right votes in the 1990s are also 
the districts with a high share of votes for the AfD around 20 years later. But these are not 
milieus of economically or otherwise disadvantaged. Can we further narrow in on these 
milieus? The literature often suggests that a divide still separates the Western and Eastern 
parts of united Germany with respect to political culture, electoral stability, trust in 
democratic institutions etc. We therefore, thirdly, test whether this divide might explain a fair 
share in the regional variance of the AfD’s electoral success. We do find evidence for a 
stronger support of the PRR in the East, and here we see especially the interaction between 
economic deprivation and rightist milieus. But we also identify a strong internal heterogeneity 
of the East and the West with respect to AfD-support, since electoral milieus responsive to the 
ideological offer of the populist right are especially located in the relatively prosperous South 
of both the old and the new Länder, i.e. in Baden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria on the one hand, 
and Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, on the other. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. We first give a brief overview over the research on right-
wing populism and its prominent ‘losers of modernization’-explanation and derive our 
hypotheses. We then describe our data and run a number of tests on our hypotheses. The final 
section concludes and speculates about the importance of our findings for the upcoming 
federal elections. 
 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Right-wing populism is not a new phenomenon. The phenomenon as such received its label 
from the US-American Populist or People’s Party, founded in 1892, articulating mainly 
farmers’ protest against the increasing costs of railway transportation, against tariffs that were 
perceived to be tailored exclusively to industry’s interests, and against restrictive monetary 
policy, i.e. the gold-standard (Goodwyn, 1976). Already then populism took a pronounced 
anti-migration stance and invoked a sharp ‘we versus them’-rhetoric, in which the pious and 
upright countryside was pitted against a corrupt, decadent, urban East-coast elite, i.e. against 
Boston and New York bank(st)ers and Washington politicians. 
 
That economically marginalized or otherwise endangered groups feed populist movements 
with a strong dose of anti-elite rhetoric was an explanation also applied to the McCarthy-
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populism of the 1950s. McCarthyism as a right-wing hysterical movement paradoxically fell 
in a times in which the US-society and -economy seemed to be in their apex. To explain the 
advent of this populist movement in times of high growth and full employment, of general 
social upward mobility and international dominance of the American Way of Life prompted a 
proponent of modernization theory like Seymour Martin Lipset, for whom liberal democracy 
and economic well-being were intimately linked, to invoke the intolerance of the working 
class and their feeling of status anxiety: “The support which a large section of the American 
working class gives to right-wing extremism today may also be related to the greater sense of 
status deprivation felt by ‘failures’ in periods of prosperity” (Lipset, 1955: 283). A lack of 
social capital necessary to cope with rapid social change, authoritarian character traits, and a 
feeling not of falling behind, but of others closing up from behind – these were the elements 
in Lipset’s explanation for a populist outburst in times of unprecedented economic well-being.  
 
In more recent contributions to the literature on right-wing populism we find explanations 
very similar to those proposed earlier: structural economic change, increased competitive 
pressures due to economic openness or to massive immigration, and profound social 
transformations (including fundamental value change) produce ‘losers of modernization’ or 
those who anticipate to belong to this group in the near future (Betz, 1994; Swank and Betz, 
2003; Kriesi et al., 2008; Mudde, 2007a; Mudde, 2016). These Modernisierungsverlierer seek 
refuge in parties or political movements that promise to ‘take back control’, reduce 
immigration and restrict welfare entitlements to those of national citizenship. In essence, these 
explanations resemble strongly those proposed already in the 1960s. Could one easily date the 
following quotation: “Today the politics of the radical right is the politics of frustration – the 
sour impotence of those who find themselves unable to understand, let alone command, the 
complex mass society that is our polity today”? In fact, it is by Daniel Bell and was 
formulated in 1964 (Mudde, 2010), but easily could have been formulated today in one of the 
op-eds on the success of the Front National or the Brexit. Those excluded, marginalized, in 
precarious jobs or unemployed, who lack the requisite ‘social capital’ to respond adequately 
to social and economic change (Betz, 1998) are said to compromise the electoral milieu in 
which right-wing populism can prosper. As Cas Mudde recently stated in his retrospective on 
three waves of research on the populist radical right: “the growth in the scope of the study of 
the populist radical right has been accompanied by little theoretical innovation since the early 
1990s (or, really, the 1960s)” (Mudde, 2016: 8). The “predominant theoretical framework is 
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still the modernization thesis”, in our context therefore the ‘losers of modernization’-
explanation.  
 
But if modernization creates these losers in bust- as well as in boom-times, it seems hard to 
test for the economic factors that play such a central role in the attempts to explain the success 
of populist radical right. The modernization framework appears as an ‘all weather’-
explanation which either points to real economic hardship causing resentment or which – for 
prosperous times – emphasizes a subjective feeling of ‘relative loss’ if a certain group has not 
benefitted as much from economic growth as others: “Hard times mobilize economic group 
antagonisms, prosperity liberates the public for the expression of its more luxurious 
hostilities” (Hofstadter, 1962: 83). Somehow, populism always seems to fit and benefit: In 
times of recession we see distributive conflict fueling bitterness, in times of prosperity we see 
status-anxiety and battles over status-preservation. But both for good as well as bad times, 
these early explanations within the frame of modernization theory pointed to the working 
class and the lower middle-class as the main social culprits, responsible for populist responses 
to the challenges of modernity. This is not to say that it does not make sense to look at the 
political and electoral fallout of the Great Recession (Funke et al., 2015; Lindvall, 2014; 
Kriesi, 2012). However, Germany’s quick and quite spectacular economic recovery after 
2008/9 and the parallel rise of the AfD as a party that at least initially reacted rather to the 
German fiscal obligations in the Greek malaise than to a German malaise rises doubts as to 
how persuasive such an explanatory link from economics to elections would be.  
 
Of course, the literature has not only highlighted individual propensities to vote for the 
extreme right, but also the context on the macro-level – for instance high unemployment 
(Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Golder, 2003a; Arzheimer, 2009) or a lack of social 
compensation against the risks of economic globalization (Swank and Betz, 2003). In a 
comparative perspective structural factors like effective and/or legal electoral thresholds, 
which hinder or facilitate the entry of new parties, then of course also play a role. Strategies of 
the established parties and “collusion politics” (Bornschier, 2012; Bale, 2003; Meguid, 2005) 
or electoral institutions (Golder, 2003b: but see; Carter, 2004) shape the success of right-wing 
populist parties as well, in particular at the initial entry phase. And we see more complex 
explanations, for instance those identifying a ‘latent’ reservoir of authoritarian and anti-liberal 
attitudes that are triggered in times of crisis and/or by skillful political entrepreneurs (Scheuch 
and Klingemann, 1967). The main issue of contention remains then whether these 
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authoritarian attitudes represent a ‘normal pathology’ or a ‘pathological normalcy’ (Mudde, 
2010), i.e. how widespread and commonly shared these attitudes are. In the center of these 
explanations still are those hit by unfavorable economic circumstances or ‘at risk’ to be hit by 
them, who then active these latent sentiments or whose sentiments get activated by the new 
populist right. Such modified versions of the modernization framework suggest that we 
should be able to find, even if somehow blurred through anticipation instead of realization of 
economic setbacks, socio-economic correlates of right-wing populism. And that we should 
find those among the somehow deprived and disadvantaged or endangered.  
 
Approaches emphasizing the supply- rather than the demand-side lead to similar expectations, 
since the new populist parties seem to target primarily those vulnerable socio-economic 
groups that figure prominently also in the demand-driven explanations for right-wing 
populism (Mudde, 2010), the working class and the lower middle-class or petite bourgeoisie. 
These classes are said to hold the anti-migration and nationalist attitudes that are associated 
with support for PRR-parties (Bornschier, 2012; Oesch, 2008; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). The two groups’ profoundly different preferences with 
respect to socio-economic policies (more redistribution and state regulation the first, lower 
taxes and less state regulation the second) might explain the fact that the populist radical right 
mobilizes “primarily along the value/identity dimension and not so much on the socio-
economic dimension of electoral politics” (Röth et al., 2017; Rovny, 2013) The clear 
demarcated socio-economic carrier groups of the new right populism remain nevertheless the 
same. We therefore ask whether ‘deprivation’ in its multi-faceted character in any way 
correlates with the recent electoral success of Germany’s new populist right party, the AfD.  
 
Alternatively, one could expect that electoral success is not due to socio-economic, but due to 
socio-cultural factors: In this perspective, support for the Populist Radical Right is driven by 
specific values and attitudes, such as rejection of multiculturalism and immigration, a high 
esteem for traditional values and a regard for the national identity as well as a general 
dissatisfaction with the political system (Bornschier, 2010; Knigge, 1998; Lubbers et al., 
2002). Such socio-cultural attitudes need not be directly and exclusively ‘derived’ from 
unfavorable economic conditions (see for instance Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) but might 
represent an explanatory factor in its own right, rooted in different political cultures.  
But can the AfD draw upon a certain right-leaning electoral milieu? The lack of a nationally 
established populist right party in Germany has been puzzling for researchers since 
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Bornschier (2010); Bornschier (2012) and Kriesi et al. (2008) have shown the existence of an 
electorate with anti-universalists, anti-immigration and exclusionists attitudes susceptible to a 
populist right mobilization that share specific socio-economic commonalities, just as in other 
advanced industrialized democracies. However, internal divisions within the radical right, the 
historical taboo of right extremism and the strategies of the established parties have prevented 
the success of a populist right party so far with the partial and short-lived exception of the 
Republikaner in some states in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Bornschier, 2012; Jaschke, 
1999; Art, 2006; Arzheimer, 2015). Nevertheless, the AfD might draw on the same milieus as 
these unsuccessful predecessors.  
 
From the above we formulate two hypotheses: 
(H1) The more disadvantaged a district, the higher the vote share of the populist right in this 
district. 
(H2) The stronger the support for radical right parties traditionally has been in a district, the 
higher the vote share of the populist right in this district today. 
 
Most studies on German politics assume differences in political attitudes between the Eastern 
and Western part of Germany, due to differences in political socialization in the four decades 
of a divided nation, and due to the lesser degree to which an initially Western party system 
has been entrenched in the East. The Eastern German party system has been consolidated only 
recently and differs from its Western complement, for instance, by the strong position of the 
populist-left Die Linke which represented “the main party of the left” in Eastern Germany in 
the last two parliamentary elections. One therefore could plausibly assume, for example, that 
a lower degree of party identification leads to a higher propensity to cast a protest vote, which 
then might benefit an extreme party like the AfD. We therefore test a third hypothesis:  
(H3) The AfD finds more electoral support in the new German states.  
 
We now turn to the empirical analysis. 
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Data and approach 
The evidence we present is based on two data sources: first, administrative data2 provide us 
with a unique range of socio-economic indicators at the district level.3 We match these data, 
secondly, with official election outcomes from the 2013 federal election, provided by the 
regional statistical offices. In the federal elections in the fall of 2013 the newly founded AfD 
gained 4.7 percent of all votes, and very narrowly missed the legal five-percent threshold to 
enter the national parliament. To inquire whether today’s support for the AfD draws upon 
previous electoral support for parties of the radical right, we add the results from the elections 
to the European Parliament (EP) in 1995, 1999 and 2014. Combined this provides us with a 
uniquely rich data set, with a sufficiently large number of observations for the dependent 
variable as well as very detailed information on our theoretical concept of interest, namely 
deprivation. Our data allows us to compare recent election outcomes with much earlier 
election results in the 1990s as another improvement over previous analyses (cf. Frank, 2015). 
But why do we not make use of individual data like those provided by the Sozio-
ökonomisches Panel (SOEP), the German panel study with detailed information on the socio-
economic background of the respondents? This is mainly out of two reasons: first, with 
respect to socially and economically marginalized groups the representativeness of survey 
data even of such as the SOEP is in question. Given that those at the ‘fringes of society’ are 
also systematically less likely to participate in such an encompassing and annually repeated 
survey, we have to fear substantial underreporting of exactly those groups that interest us 
most (Selb and Munzert, 2013; Caballero, 2005; Tourangeau et al., 2010). Second, the 
reliability of SOEP’s data on political behavior is very much in question, too. Participation in 
elections is systematically over-reported even in electoral surveys, let alone in other 
individual level surveys. The same holds for the voting for extreme parties. In fact, SOEP 
does not even contain information about the ‘last vote’, but only asks for ‘closeness to party’, 
which can mean many things when it comes to actual voting behavior. In contrast, our data 
provide ‘hard’ information both with respect to our dependent variable and our independent 
variables. This, in our view, trumps the ‘ecological fallacy’ drawback that comes with the use 
of aggregated data. With INKAR’s more than 400 observations per year, the ecological 
problem seems less severe anyway.  
 
                                                 
2 Indikatoren und Karten zur Raumentwicklung (http://www.bbsr.bund.de) 
3 The data refers to 2012. 
 10 
Additionally, our data has particular advantages also with respect to our main explanatory 
variable, namely deprivation. To assess the importance of socio-economic conditions for 
radical electoral behavior we want to go beyond simply looking at unemployment or average 
income as indicators of disadvantage but to consider a broader dimension of economic and 
social deprivation. We make use of the rich information on socio-economic conditions at the 
district level that INKAR provides, from which we create an index of deprivation. The 
following indicators go into the principal component factor analysis, all on the district level: 
share of unemployment, share of unemployed below the age of 25, share of those above the 
age of 55 among the unemployed, share of long-term unemployed, employment rate, average 
household income, share of births given by teenage mothers on all births, share of those who 
leave school with high-school degree, squared household size, remaining life expectancy at 
the age of 60 years, share of under-employed, ‘mini-jobs’ as share of all employment, old-age 
poverty measured as the share of old age pensioners that have to rely on supplementary 
benefits from the state, average age when entering retirement, child poverty measured as the 
share of children that have to rely on supplementary benefits from the state, share of those in 
private insolvency, share of those on welfare or unemployment support, single mothers on 
welfare, single mothers below 25 years old on welfare, extent of welfare transfers, distance to 
next hospital, short-term and long-term labor market support.  
 
The resulting first factor is our indicator of economic deprivation (see Appendix A for more 
information on the factor analysis). For the sake of brevity, we refer to the indicator as index 
of deprivation. The index of deprivation correlates strongly but not perfectly with 
unemployment or average household-income (see Table 1). In particular the less than perfect 
correlation with average household income reflects that other factors than income play a role 
in economic and social deprivation.  
 
Correlation with deprivation Unemployment Average household income 
Germany 0.945 -0.593 
West Germany 0.935 -0.434 
East Germany 0.925 -0.445 
Table 1: Correlation between index of deprivation, unemployment and household income 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the regional distribution of the AfD’s vote share in the federal elections in 
2013 as our main dependent variable. It shows that the party’s support is by no means 
 11 
exclusively found in the Eastern part of Germany. Rather, there seems to be a North-South 
divide which overlays the former East-West division. The AfD gained substantial support in 
the South of the old Bundesrepublik and the South of the new Bundesländer, as the dark 
pattern in Saxony and Baden-Wurttemberg as well as Bavaria show, whereas it fared less well 
in the North of West Germany as well as in the Western districts of Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern.  
 
Figure 1: Regional distribution of the AfD vote share in the federal elections in 2013 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of our index of deprivation, the left panel displays the 
geographical distribution and the right panel displays the statistical distribution of our index. 
The map of deprivation reveals systematic variation both in the East/West and North/South 
dimension. In 2013, the disadvantaged are most strongly clustered in the cities of the Ruhr-
area (Hamm, Herne, Duisburg, Essen, Recklinghausen or Gelsenkirchen which has the 
highest score), in the Northwest and in the East of Germany (such as Bremen, Bremerhaven, 
Wilhelmshaven, Magdeburg, Halle or Leipzig) struggling with de-industrialization as well as 
the rural areas in the North-Eastern part of Germany (for example Uckermark, Vorpommern-
Greifswald, Burgenland, Salzlandkreis). The South of Germany, by contrast, knows little 
social and economic deprivation as the light shades of the Southern districts show. In 
particular Bayern is prosperous. From the 20 districts with the lowest level of deprivation, 19 
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are to be found in Bayern but levels of deprivation are low in Rhineland-Palatinate and 
Baden-Wurttemberg as well. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of index of deprivation (2012)  
 
Whether a populist vote choice and socio-economic deprivation go together, and if so how is 
analyzed in the following. We examine the relationship between the vote share of the AfD in 
parliamentary elections of 2013 in administrative districts (Kreis or kreisfreie Stadt) and their 
level of deprivation with OLS regressions, controlling for the clustered data structured with 
state clustered state errors. We further control for the urbanity of the district since populist 
parties tend to gain less votes in urban districts, and we control for the share of foreigners 
which might affect the vote share of the AfD as well (Arzheimer, 2009; Golder, 2003a; 
Swank and Betz, 2003; Lubbers et al., 2002).  
 
 
Results 
To start with the clearest and most striking finding: In contrast to the dominant ‘losers of 
modernization’-explanation, we do not find any political economy explanation to the success 
of the AfD. The results in Table 2 provide no evidence in support of this thesis. The first 
model (M1) shows the simple effect of deprivation on the electoral success of the AfD in the 
federal elections of 2013 and finds a slightly negative and insignificant effect. There is no 
evidence that the AfD achieves higher gains in disadvantaged districts in the Eastern nor 
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Western part of Germany (M2) which leads us to reject H1. This finding also holds when 
analyzing the elections to the European Parliament in 2014 in which the populist right in 
Germany achieved its electoral breakthrough (see Appendix B). 
 
As to the control variables: The AfD achieves higher vote shares in the Eastern part of 
Germany as the estimate for the Eastern Germany dummy evidences – we will come back to 
this finding when discussing hypothesis H3. With a higher share of foreigners and in rural 
districts, the vote share of the AfD increases as well. 
 
 
M1 M2 
Index Deprivation  -0.062 -0.012    
 
(0.11) (0.11)    
Eastern Germany 1.957*** 2.398*** 
 
(0.41) (0.40)    
Urban district -0.585** -0.607**  
 
(0.21) (0.21)    
Share of foreigners 0.105*** 0.106*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02)    
Deprivation*East Germany -0.470    
  
(0.40)    
Constant 3.666*** 3.681*** 
 
(0.22) (0.22)    
R2 0.313 0.325    
N 402 402    
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. OLS regressions with state clustered standard errors; 
*significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level, ***significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Table 2: Modernization hypothesis (H1): Estimates for AfD vote share in the federal elections 
of 2013  
 
 
We tested variants of the “loser of modernization”-argument (those results can be found in 
Appendix C): First, we re-ran the analysis with individual components of the deprivation 
index. These individual components as the unemployment rate or the average household 
income for instance do not influence the vote share of the AfD either. Second, we considered 
the social and economic aspect of deprivation separately. One of the strengths of our index is 
that it captures not only purely economic disadvantages but includes indicators of social 
disadvantages such as poor public services or an adverse demographic structure as well. 
Perhaps the social aspects of deprivation are more important than the strictly economic ones. 
We therefore constructed two sub-indexes, one capturing the state of public services and one 
capturing the demographic structure. We also tested whether the AfD prospers in districts 
with a decline in the population or a decline in the younger population as indicators of 
subjective pitiable economic conditions. Neither indicator suggests an effect on the success of 
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the AfD. Similarly, we examined whether the effect of economic hardship might be non-
linear, based on the idea that those who are afraid of losing might vote for the radical right 
rather than those who already find themselves on the losing side (individual level data 
suggests this, see Rovny and Rovny, 2017). Again, we did not find a significant effect of the 
squared index of deprivation. 
 
Third, it has been argued that it is not economic hardship that drives support for radical parties 
but economic insecurity, that is fear of job loss (Swank and Betz, 2003). We therefore tested 
the effect of de-industrialization (loss in industrial employment over 2 and 5 years) and 
unemployment shocks (unemployment change of 2 and 5 years) on the success of the AfD 
without finding any significant effect in Eastern nor Western Germany.  
 
If there is no political economy explanation for the electoral success of the AfD, what then 
might drive support for the party? As argued above, the determinants might not be socio-
economic, but socio-cultural, that is due to specific political milieus where support for radical 
right ideology thrives (H2). Examining political cultures or social milieus is difficult in 
particular without data on attitudes and political values. As a proxy, we therefore examine 
whether the success of the AfD in 2013 is related to a tradition of radical right voting, 
measured by the success of radical right parties such as the Nationaldemokratische Partei  
(NDP), Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) or Die Republikaner (REP) in previous elections. We 
use data from the elections to the European Parliament, here the EP-elections in 1999 (see 
Table 3), a second order election with a higher share of radical right voters. That allows us to 
identify the electoral milieus we are interested in. 
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M1 M2 M3 
Index Deprivation 0.180* 0.111 -0.386    
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.25)    
Eastern Germany 1.416*** -0.597 1.209*** 
 
(0.38) (0.93) (0.40)    
Urban district -0.604*** -0.482** -0.502**  
 
(0.19) (0.22) (0.19)    
Share of foreigners 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.070*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Radical Right in ‘99 0.286*** 0.213** 0.374*** 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)    
Radical right in ‘99*East Germany 
 
0.771** 
 
  
(0.27) 
 Radical right in ‘99*Deprivation 
  
0.217**  
   
(0.07)    
Constant 3.259*** 3.365*** 3.182*** 
  (0.25) (0.27) (0.28)    
R2 0.392 0.442 0.435    
N 394 394 394    
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. OLS regressions with state clustered standard errors; 
*significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level, ***significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Table 3: Electoral milieu hypothesis (H2): Estimates for AfD vote share in the federal 
elections of 2013  
 
What do we then observe once we control for the previous history of a rightist vote? Whereas 
the coefficients of the other variables remain basically unchanged as compared to our 
preceding specifications in Table 2, the variable capturing a tradition of radical-right voting is 
strong and highly significant in all models, regardless of the level of deprivation in the 
district. A radical right vote share of 10 percent in 1999 translates into a vote share of 2.3 
percent for the AfD in 2013. The surprisingly strong and positive relationship between the 
early and the contemporary PRR-vote that Table 3 demonstrates is visualized in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Visual representation of the relationship between the success of extreme right 
parties in the elections to the European Parliament in 1999 and the success of the AfD in the 
federal elections of 2013, based on M1 of Table 3 
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This effect is not limited to the elections in 1999. If we insert the vote share of extreme right 
parties in other EP elections as the one in 1999, the relationship remains positive (results not 
shown). We take this as evidence in support of our second hypothesis: Apparently, certain 
electoral milieus without distinct socio-economic group characteristics were in the past and 
are still today particularly responsive to the ideological stance of a populist radical-right party, 
although economic deprivation and a tradition of radical right voting reinforce each other (see 
Appendix D). Importantly, this holds for Eastern and Western Germany as separate analyses 
show. 
 
Hence, our findings reject the first, political economy, hypothesis, but support our second 
hypothesis about a tradition of extreme right voting in certain districts in which the AfD 
prospers today.4  
 
When we now ask where these specific AfD-friendly milieus are to be found, one quite 
common position in German public debate points to differences in political socialization 
between East and West, to differences in party identification, and to the degree to which the 
initially Western party system became established in the East and turned into a nation-wide 
unified party system. This seems to correspond to differences in values and political attitudes 
between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ states going beyond differences in the socio-economic 
conditions of the two regions. We therefore test hypothesis 3 whether we find empirically any 
substantial differences in AfD-support between Germany’s East and West. In a simple OLS 
framework this seems to be confirmed (see Tables 2 and 3 above). The dummy for the Eastern 
states remains significant throughout all specifications. The AfD enjoys stronger support in 
the East – independent from the higher degree of economic deprivation in the new German 
states. 
 
This regional impact might be visualized in a graph that plots distance from the former Inner-
German boarder on the x-axis with average support for the AfD in a district on the y-axis. We 
measure distance in a simple way by counting from 1 upwards to the East and from 0 
                                                 
4 Our findings at the macro-level echo recent findings based on individual level data. Based on evidence of a 
panel study on AfD voters, Goerres et al. (2017) find that political attitudes associated with support for the 
populist right, that is attitudes on immigration, dissatisfaction with the political system as well as socialization 
effects drove support for the AfD more strongly than socio-economic factors in 2015 and 2016. 
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downwards for the Western states, starting with those districts that before 1990 had laid 
directly at both sides of the former wall. If political socialization in the East is the ‘treatment’ 
that led to different political attitudes which then result in different vote choice, one should be 
able to observe an upward jump in AfD-support if one moves from the most eastern district in 
the West to the most western district in the East. And that is what we indeed observe (see 
Figure 4).   
 
 
Figure 4: Geographical distribution of AfD vote share in the federal elections of 2013, 
conditional upon distance from the former Inner-German boarder 
 
 
Yet, the East/West-divide is not the only interesting geographical pattern. Our depiction of the 
regional distribution of the AfD’s success in the federal election in 2013 showed considerable 
variation of support for the populist-right within Eastern and Western Germany (see Figure 2). 
The electoral milieus that are responsive to the ideological offer of the AfD are located in the 
prosperous south of both Eastern and Western Germany, i.e. in Baden-Wurttemberg and 
Bavaria on the one hand, and Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, on the other. Studying the success 
of the AfD from a mere East-West perspective, therefore, risks overseeing the substantial 
within-variation. A recent study on the political culture of Germany highlights the existence 
of several distinct regional political cultures in Germany characterized by different values and 
attitudes towards constitutional democracy (Mannewitz, 2015). These regional political 
cultures, comprising between one and four states, cut across the East-West divide and reveal 
substantial variation within Western and even more so within Eastern Germany. Differences 
in political culture, which Mannewitz (2015) relates to differences in religious traditions, the 
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amount of social capital and the historic experience with socialist revolutions, might be 
relevant for the success of the AfD as populist parties conjure resentments and mistrust 
against the ruling political elite.  
 
Exploring these differences systematically goes beyond the scope of this paper but remains 
for future research on the subject. We would like, however, to end our paper by illustrating 
the relevance of sub-regional differences in values and attitudes that have been identified as 
relevant for right-wing populism, namely attitudes towards immigrants (Arzheimer, 2009; 
Lubbers et al., 2002; Oesch, 2008; Kriesi et al., 2008). Based on data from the 2014 ALLBUS 
wave, Figure 5 shows the estimates of state dummies on attitudes on immigrants (score of 
factor analysis, see Appendix E) and trust in the government, controlling for compositional 
effects that is controlling for gender, age, education and occupation of the respondents and the 
average state level of deprivation.  
 
Figure 5: sub-regional variance in attitudes towards immigrants and trust in government, 
source: ALLBUS 2014 
 
 
The figure reveals substantial variation in attitudes towards immigrants and trust in 
government both within and across Eastern and Western Germany. Attitudes towards 
immigrants are particularly negative in the South of West Germany (Rhineland Palatine and 
Baden-Wuerttemberg) and East Germany (Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia) while trust 
in the government is considerably lower in Hamburg, Rhineland Palatine and Berlin, 
 19 
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Thuringia. To what extent such differences in 
values and attitudes explain the varying success of the AfD is subject for further research 
which might in particular explore cultural differences at lower geographical or historical units 
than states which comprise rather heterogeneous regional units themselves.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Right-wing populism is on the rise. Everywhere? Until recently, the resilience of the German 
party system to such a right-wing populist party has been an exception to this general trend, 
often explained with the specific German past, the strategies of the mainstream parties or the 
internal division within the radical right in Germany (Bornschier, 2012). The creation and 
subsequent establishment of the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in the 
German party system since the Eurozone crisis in 2012 put an end to this German 
exceptionalism. In this paper, we examine the plausibility of one of the most dominant 
explanations for right-wing populist voting to account for the success of the AfD, namely the 
‘losers of modernization’-thesis, for the federal elections in 2013 and the EP-elections in 
2014. Based on district level data from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban 
Affairs and Spatial Development (Raumforschung, 2016) and official data on electoral 
outcomes at the district level, we examine whether the socio-economic characteristics of a 
district yield any explanatory power for the AfD’s electoral success. Our findings suggest that 
the modernization thesis bears little relevance for the success of the populist right in 
Germany. By contrast, we find a strong correlation between the success of the AfD in 2013 
and 2014 and the success of radical right parties in previous elections. We explain this 
intriguing finding with a “tradition of radical right ideas” on which the AfD has been able to 
draw once the broader political and social context allowed for the creation of a right-wing 
populist party in Germany.  
This has at least one major implication for the question whether the electoral success of the 
Populist Radical Right should be seen as a temporary phenomenon or whether it will last. Our 
finding that the support for the AfD is rather independent from economic factors and 
particularly strong now at a moment in which the German economy is doing extremely well, 
suggests that this new party is going to stay and to become a stable element in the party 
system. It will also not do to simply address economic grievances, when the main conflict line 
is of socio-cultural character.     
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Appendix:  
Appendix A: Factor analysis for deprivation index 
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Uniqueness  
Unemployment 0.945 -0.038 0.258 -0.044 0.037 
Young unemployed 0.872 -0.237 0.259 -0.096 0.107 
Old unemployed 0.866 -0.112 0.374 0.059 0.094 
Long-term unemployed 0.809 0.134 -0.128 0.154 0.288 
Under employment 0.935 0.041 0.295 -0.053 0.035 
Mini-jobbers -0.202 0.802 0.001 -0.267 0.245 
Av. Household income -0.593 0.326 -0.234 0.340 0.372 
Size of households2 -0.618 -0.326 -0.361 -0.228 0.330 
Share of foreigners -0.128 0.805 -0.014 0.317 0.235 
Poverty in old age 0.263 0.891 0.007 -0.064 0.133 
Children in poverty 0.926 0.210 0.220 -0.066 0.045 
Age of entry into retirement -0.349 0.108 -0.362 0.512 0.474 
Dependency on ALG II 0.946 0.143 0.212 -0.043 0.039 
Average level of ALG II 0.944 0.129 0.229 -0.041 0.038 
Long-term labor market support 0.240 0.179 0.886 -0.034 0.124 
Short term labor market support 0.435 -0.058 0.868 -0.009 0.055 
Single parents on benefits -0.848 -0.004 0.081 -0.214 0.230 
Young single parents on benefits -0.642 -0.095 0.120 -0.529 0.285 
Life expectancy at 65 years -0.563 0.164 -0.032 0.590 0.307 
Private insolvency procedures 0.640 0.298 0.014 -0.412 0.332 
Level of old age pensions 0.600 -0.180 0.169 0.598 0.221 
Birth by teenage moms 0.763 -0.085 0.378 -0.173 0.238 
Distance to next hospital -0.223 -0.776 -0.189 -0.118 0.298 
Table A.1: Factor loadings of the factor analysis for economic and social deprivation index, 
source: Inkar 2017 
 
 
Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 10.65 7.37 0.463 0.463 
Factor 2 3.28 0.68 0.143 0.606 
Factor 3 2.60 0.71 0.113 0.719 
Factor4  1.90 
 
0.083 0.802 
 
Table A.2: Eigenvalues of the factor analysis for economic and social deprivation index 
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Appendix B: Analysis with AfD vote share in elections to the EP in 2014 
 
M1 M2 
Deprivation index -0.006** -0.007*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Eastern Germany 0.027*** 0.021** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Urban district -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Share of Foreigners 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Eastern Germany * Deprivation 
 
0.006 
  
(0.01) 
Constant 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
R2 0.216 0.223 
N 402 402 
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. OLS regressions with state clustered standard errors; 
*significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level, ***significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table B.1: Modernization hypothesis: Estimates for AfD vote share to the EP in 2014 from 
OLS regressions 
 
The effect of deprivation on the success of the AfD in the EP election of 2014 is not only pointing in 
the wrong direction but also highly unstable and vanishes once we include further control variables 
such as the level of social capital (results not shown) and most importantly, the strength of extreme 
right parties in previous elections. 
 
 
M1 M2 
 
M3 
Deprivation index 0.002 0.001 0.003    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Eastern Germany 0.025*** 
 
0.025*** 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00)    
Urban district -0.005 -0.007 -0.005    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Share of Foreigners 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001**  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Eastern Germany * Deprivation 
  
 
   
 
Share of radical right EP'94 0.345*** 
 
0.340*** 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.07)    
Share of radical right EP'89 
 
0.217***  
  
(0.05)  
Share of radical right EP'99 
  
0.042    
   
(0.15)    
Share of radical right EP '14 
  
-0.070    
   
(0.13)    
Constant 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)    
R2 0.485 0.453 0.486    
N 344 325 344    
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. OLS regressions with state clustered standard errors; 
*significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level, ***significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table B.2: Electoral Milieu: Estimates for AfD vote share to the EP in 2014 from OLS 
regressions 
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Appendix C: Robustness tests 
 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8    
Eastern Germany 2.047*** 2.063*** 1.682*** 1.856*** 1.874*** 1.875*** 1.874*** 1.875*** 
 
(0.38) (0.41) (0.37) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41)    
Urban district -0.533** -0.516* -0.721*** -0.886*** -0.641*** -0.642*** -0.641*** -0.642*** 
 
(0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.30) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)    
Share of foreigners 0.104*** 0.091*** 0.117*** 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Unemployment -0.047 
       
 
(0.04) 
       Average household income 
 
0.001** 
      
  
(0.00) 
      State of public services  
  
0.153 
     
   
(0.09) 
     Demographic structure 
   
0.144 
    
    
(0.11) 
    Loss in young population (5 years) 
    
-0.000 
   
     
(0.00) 
   Loss in young population (2 years) 
     
-0.000 
  
      
(0.00) 
  Loss in population (5 years) 
      
-0.000 
 
       
(0.00) 
 Loss in population (2 years) 
       
-0.000    
        
(0.00)    
Constant 3.890*** 2.201*** 3.661*** 3.791*** 3.677*** 3.678*** 3.677*** 3.678*** 
  (0.27) (0.59) (0.19) (0.25) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)    
R2 0.317 0.332 0.320 0.316 0.311 0.312 0.311 0.312    
N 402 402 402 402 402 402 402 402    
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. OLS regressions with state clustered standard errors; *significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level, 
***significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Table C.1: Alternative specifications of the modernization thesis I: Estimates for AfD vote share in the federal elections of 2013 
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M9 M10 M11 M12 M13 
Index of deprivation 0.286*         
 
(0.15) 
    Index of deprivation^2 -0.084 
    
 
(0.09) 
    Urban district -0.403 -0.634*** -0.636*** -0.635*** -0.636*** 
 
(0.27) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)    
Share of foreigners 0.023 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 
 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Eastern Germany 
 
1.884*** 1.871*** 1.857*** 1.877*** 
  
(0.45) (0.44) (0.40) (0.41)    
increase in unemployment (5 years) 
 
0.003 
   
  
(0.09) 
   increase in unemployment (2 years) 
  
-0.011 
  
   
(0.17) 
  Decrease in industrial employment (5 years) 
  
-0.020 
 
    
(0.02) 
 Decrease in industrial employment (2 years) 
   
-0.004    
     
(0.02)    
Constant 4.703*** 3.692*** 3.688*** 3.718*** 3.693*** 
  (0.44) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20)    
R2 0.057 0.311 0.311 0.312 0.311    
N 402 402 402 402 402    
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard errors. OLS regressions with state clustered standard errors; *significant at the 0.1 level, **significant at the 0.05 level, 
***significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table C.2: Alternative specifications of the modernization thesis II: Estimates for AfD vote share in the federal elections of 2013 
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Appendix D: Interaction between economic deprivation and tradition of radical right 
voting 
 
 
 
Figure D.1: Effect of vote share of radical right party in the election to the European 
parliament in 1999 on the AfD vote share in 2013, depending on deprivation 
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Appendix E: Factor analysis for attitudes towards immigrants 
Factor Eigenvalue   Difference Proportion   Cumulative 
Factor1 3.28808      2.37406 0.4697       0.4697 
Factor2 0.91402      0.14083 0.1306       0.6003 
Factor3 0.77320      0.19130 0.1105       0.7108 
Factor4 0.58190      0.03172 0.0831       0.7939 
Factor5 0.55017      0.08537 0.0786       0.8725 
Factor6 0.46481      0.03698 0.0664       0.9389 
Factor7 0.42782           0.0611       1.0000 
   
   Variable Factor1 Uniqueness  
No integration without assimilation 0.6362 0.5953   
No state help for minorities 0.5975 0.6430   
Immigrants should assimilate 0.6384 0.5925   
Immigrants increase crime rate 0.7390 0.4539   
Immigrants good for German economy 0.6434 0.5860   
immigrants steal jobs 0.7289 0.4687   
We should reduce number of 
immigrants 0.7920 0.3727   
 
Source: Allbus 2014, variables: V680-V685, V691 
